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Abstract
Traitor-tracing (aka fingerprinting) has received much attention as a possible
solution for protecting media copyrights. However, current schemes for im-
age and video fingerprinting lack robustness against geometric attacks. We
propose a novel semi-blind fingerprinting scheme that can cope with such at-
tacks. The scheme improves a state-of-the-art high-rate fingerprinting code
that can resist tens of colluders and Gaussian noise but has no resistance
against geometric attacks.
Our scheme uses compressed SURF (Speeded-Up Robust Features) image
features as side information in order to estimate and invert any geometric
attack in a given class. We consider simple linear attacks (affine transforms),
and more complex ones (homography and image warping). Our Estimation-
Elimination algorithm estimates the attack parameters by matching image
features and eliminating iteratively suspected outliers. We also compare this
method to an adapted version of RANSAC (Random Sample Consensus).
The fingerprints are embedded securely and invisibly using Spread Trans-
form Dither Modulation (STDM) applied to the intermediate level of a
Laplace decomposition of the image. The fingerprints are robust against
common attacks such as averaging, interleaving, addition of Gaussian noise,
JPEG compression (with quality factor Q = 45), cropping (50% of the image
area), affine transforms, homography and image warping.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The multimedia industry has never been so important worldwide: 2.5 mil-
lions jobs are related to the film and television industry in the US, directly
or indirectly, according to the Motion Picture Association of America [1].
Moreover, this industry brings more than $80 billion annually to the US
economy [2].
On the other side, copyright infringement has also never been so present:
from in-theater camcording and illegal redistribution networks to CD/DVD
illegal copies and peer-to-peer, the multimedia industry is attacked at every
level [3]. The loss for the movie industry due to piracy in 2005 was estimated
to be more than $18 billion worldwide, $6.1 billion in the US and $2.7 billion
in China [4]. Similarly, the cost of piracy was estimated to be around $1.5
billion and 10,000 jobs in France in 2008 [5]. According to several reports,
this loss is mainly imputable to recordings of movies in theaters, leading
to illegal DVDs and files available for downloading. Moreover, the major-
ity of awards-nominated movies can be downloaded illegally before they are
officially released due to leaks in the rating process.
One of the main tools to prevent such copyright enfringements is traitor-
tracing (aka fingerprinting or forensic watermarking), among other tech-
niques like watermarking and robust hashing. The idea is to insert a unique
mark in a multimedia content, which contains information about the user or
the date, time, and location of broadcast. This mark, also called a fingerprint,
is intended to be hard to remove in order to prevent illegal redistribution.
The embedding process takes advantage of the human visual or auditory sys-
tem to make the mark invisible. However, colluders (traitors) may process
their individual copies and create a pirated copy in order to remove traces
of their fingerprints, often accepting to alter the quality of the multimedia
content, in exchange for lower probability of detection. When a pirated copy
is found, extracting its fingerprint enables the distributor to trace at least
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Figure 1.1: Fingerprinting scheme with K colluders and M users.
one of the colluders.
Such techniques have been used for other applications for centuries. For
instance, in the 17th century, some of the least significant digits of logarithm
tables were intentionally modified in order to identify users who tried to
illegally reproduce the tables [6]. More recently, the use of steganography in
printers enables to know where and when a document was printed and which
model of printer was used [7]. In the movie industry, some motion picture
distributors inserted visible dots in projected movies, identifying the cinema
and the date of projection [8].
Nowadays, fingerprinting is used widely in several applications: digital
cinema to prevent recordings in theaters, pre-release copies to prevent leaks,
online pay-per-view, etc. Thereby, the use of traitor-tracing has helped dis-
mantle several piracy networks, such as the 2005 arrest of William Sprague
who stole several major motion picture copies prior to their theatrical or
DVD release [9], or the 2008 apprehension of Robert Henderson who made
counterfeit DVDs from recordings in a movie theater [10].
The global process of multimedia traitor-tracing is diagrammed in Fig.
1.1. The encoder encodes each user’s binary bitstream and a secret key into
a fingerprint that is designed to be robust against collusion. Each fingerprint
is then inserted into a copy of the original content. The marked copies are
then distributed to the corresponding users. Some of them might collude and
process their copies to create a forgery. The colluders are assumed to know
the entire fingerprinting scheme, except for the secret key. They can use all
kinds of operations provided the content is not too much altered: addition
of white noise, compression, averaging or interleaving of several copies, geo-
metric attacks, etc. Once the forgery is retrieved by the distributor, it is first
2
resynchronized using side information about the original content. Then, the
fingerprint can be extracted from the resynchronized content and decoded in
order to find one of the colluders.
Several efficient traitor-tracing codes have been presented recently. For
example, Jourdas designed two codes, one high-rate and random-like [11, 12]
and another one low-rate with high minimimum distance [13]. The first one
is short, can accomodate millions of users and can deal with tens of collud-
ers. He and Wu proposed two joint coding-embedding schemes. The first
one, called GRACE (Group-Based Joint Coding and Embedding), assumes
that users are gathered in social groups inside which they are more likely
to collude. Orthogonal fingerprints are used inside each group [14]. The
second scheme uses a very long code based on Reed-Solomon which can ac-
comodate millions of users [15]. Trappe et al. introduced Anti-Collusion
Codes (ACC) [16], which are applications of Superimposed Codes (SIC) [17]
to traitor-tracing. Those codes have the property that any composition of
K fingerprints is unique, and thus are efficient under the Boneh and Shaw
marking assumption [18]. More recently and similarly, Korzhik et al. de-
signed random Superimposed Codes (SIC) [19] which have been shown to
outperform ACC under a distortion assumption rather than a marking as-
sumption.
Most of these codes are efficient against additive white noise, averaging of
several copies and some non-linear operations (interleaving, median attacks,
etc). However, none of them was designed to be robust against desynchro-
nization. For instance, while Jourdas’ code [11] is near-capacity achieving
under averaging plus Gaussian noise attacks, the code fails against a rota-
tion by just 1◦ or a scaling of factor 1.1. Our goal is to enhance such schemes
with a layer that protects the fingerprint against such geometric attacks.
Jourdas’ code [11] will be used as a proof of concept.
Geometric attacks have only been studied in the restricted application of
watermarking. While traitor-tracing is a multi-user version of watermark-
ing and presents much greater challenges due to the efficiency of collusion
attacks, the design of geometrically resilient watermarking schemes is very
relevant to our study. Four different approaches have been studied to create
geometrically resilient watermarks.
The first approach consists in performing an exhaustive search for the
attack parameters inside a given class of attacks. The parameters chosen are
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those that maximize a measure of confidence (e.g. likelihood score) for the
decoder. This algorithm is computationally expensive as it usally requires
full decoding for each set of parameters being tried.
The second idea is still based on exhaustive search for the attack parame-
ters but avoids using the decoder for each iteration [20]. A fixed synchroniza-
tion mark is inserted in the watermarked copy and for each set of parameters
being tried, the synchronization mark is used to determine if the content
is well synchronized. This method is often less expensive than running the
decoder multiple times, but synchronization marks are hard to design and
cause a distortion overhead.
The third approach consists in inserting the watermark into an invari-
ant domain where the attacks considered cannot affect the fingerprint [21].
Theoretically, the watermark can then be extracted and decoded correctly
even if the content is desynchronized using one of those attacks. However,
invariant domains exist for a very limited range of attacks and do not take
advantage of the visual or audible human system.
These three approaches have been mainly used in a blind context where
the decoder does not have information about the original content. In con-
trast, non-blind systems use the original content on the decoder side, and this
facilitates resynchronization. However, the presence of the original content
as side information implies some security and storage issues.
The fourth idea, registration, is an intermediate approach, and can be
advantageously used in a semi-blind context. Here, limited information about
the original content is available to the decoder. The side information is either
a hash [22] — a short description of the content — or a collection of local
feature descriptions [23]. In both cases, one tries to register the original
content and the pirated copy in order to estimate and invert the attack. We
decided to follow this last approach and apply it to fingerprinting because
side information can improve dramatically the robustness of the fingerprint.
However, the size and security of the side information are also important
constraints for semi-blind systems.
We chose to insert the fingerprint in the medium frequencies of the mul-
timedia content. This allows us to avoid the high frequencies, which can be
entirely erased in the case of compression, and low frequencies, which are
very sensible. Moreover, a fundamental concept for both blind and semi-
blind schemes is the use of host-signal interference rejection methods such as
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Spread Transform Dither Modulation [24, 6] as opposed to spread-spectrum
modulation methods which are more suitable for non-blind schemes. Con-
ventional wisdom is that quantization-based methods are brittle against ge-
ometric attacks; however, we show this is not the case when the decoder is
provided with appropriate side information.
A natural choice for the side information in the case of images is the
SURF (Speeded-Up Robust Features) [25] features, an enhanced version of
the SIFT (Scale Invariant Feature Transform) [26] features. The SURF fea-
tures are robust to a wide range of geometric attacks and to additive noise.
Furthermore, a suitable compression of the SURF features is convenient for
storage and transmission and retains the discriminative properties of these
features.
The main steps of our traitor-tracing algorithm are the following: (i)
match the features of the forgery and those of the original image, (ii) estimate
the parameters of a given class of attacks, (iii) invert the attack, and (iv)
extract the fingerprint.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the encoder and de-
coder. Chapter 3 describes our STDM-Laplace embedding/extracting scheme.
Chapter 4 presents our choise of image features and our compression method.
Chapter 5 explains how we used this side information in order to resynchro-
nize the received image. Chapter 6 presents some experimental results for
different classes of attacks.
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Chapter 2
High-Rate Encoder and
Decoder
2.1 Encoder
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Figure 2.1: Encoder scheme for one user.
Each user is identified by a binary bitstream u of length n, so the code
can accomodate M = 2n users. The binary sequences {ui}1≤i≤M are input
to the encoder of [11], which, analogously to a turbo code, is composed of
Ni RSC (Recursive Systematic Convolutional) encoders preceeded by ran-
dom interleavers. The rate of each RSC encoder is 1/S and the generator
polyomials coefficients are randomly drawn from a Bernoulli distribution of
parameter p. The memory of the encoders is denoted by Me. As shown in
Fig. 2.1, the outputs of the RSC encoders are then concatenated to create
binary fingerprints {fi}1≤i≤M of length N = (n+Me)× S × (Ni + 1).
In order to have symmetric fingerprints for the embedding part, we switch
the domain of {fi}1≤i≤M from {0, 1}N to {−1, 1}N . In the original implemen-
tation of [11], an orthogonal code followed the RSC encoders in order to map
the fingerprint to a real-valued mark. This is not needed here because our
embedding scheme requires only a binary sequence. However, we added a
random interleaver that shuﬄes the fingerprint. This precaution prevents
the erasure of clusters of the fingerprint if part of the image is cropped.
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For illustration, the parameters of the code we used are the following:
n = 25, Ni = 4, S = 7, p = 0.7 and Me = 3. With those values, the
maximum number of users is M = 33, 554, 432, the length of the code is
N = 784, and the total rate of the code is R = n
N
= 0.032.
2.2 Decoder
The fingerprint f ′ extracted from the image Is (see Fig. 1.1) is often referred
to as the forgery and is in general real-valued. The decoder used in [11] seeks
the fingerprint that has the highest correlation with the forgery.
The forgery is first deinterleaved and then split into Ni segments of equal
length, each input to a list Viterbi decoder. The outputs of the decoders
(after deinterleaving) are lists of D suspect users. The final accused user is
determined by the highest correlation between the forgery and the suspect
fingerprints. There are at most D ×Ni such fingerprints.
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Chapter 3
Fingerprint Embedding and
Extraction
3.1 STDM-Laplace embedding
The fingerprint is embedded in the medium frequencies of the image, because
a slight modification of the low frequencies would imply a significant visual
alteration, and the high frequencies can be strongly attacked without any
major visual modification on the image. We chose the Laplacian pyramid of
the image as the transform domain to embed the fingerprint.
The embedding technique is based on STDM (Spread Transform Dither
Modulation) [24, 6]. It spreads the fingerprint bits over a large set of values
in the transform domain.
Given a host image I, we first compute its 3-level Laplacian pyramid
which results in three frequency images {LP1(I), LP2(I), LP3(I)}, respec-
tively the fine, intermediate and coarse descriptions of the image I (see Fig.
3.1). We use STDM on the intermediate description LP2(I) of the pyramid.
Given the length of the fingerprints to embed in the intermediate de-
scription LP2(I), we consider N non-overlapping blocks of equal size. Each
fingerprint bit will then be embedded in one of those blocks. The size of
those blocks is chosen in order to maximize the embedding area and we do
not embed bits on the border of the image, which may be cropped later. For
illustration, in the case where the fingerprint length is N = 784 and the size
of the intermediate description LP2(I) is 256× 256, the size of each block is
set to 9× 9. Those N blocks are then transformed into column vectors, and
we denote this set by {bj}1≤j≤N .
We project each block bj onto a random direction vj (generated using
the secret key), identical for all users:
pj = (vj)Tbj, 1 ≤ j ≤ N. (3.1)
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.1: Laplacian pyramid of Lena image: (a) Coarse description (size
128×128); (b) intermediate description (size 256×256); and (c) fine descrip-
tion (size 512× 512). Contrast has been enhanced for (b) and (c).
Given the fingerprint fi of the ith user, the projection p
j — which is a
scalar — is quantized using the uniform scalar quantizers Q−1(·) or Q1(·),
respectively, when the corresponding fingerprinting bit fij is -1 or 1. The
lattices used for the quantizers Q−1(·) and Q1(·) are respectively L−1 =
{δ(−1
4
+k), k ∈ Z} and L1 = {δ(14 +k), k ∈ Z}. The two possible quantizers
are shown on Fig. 3.2. The quantized value of the projection of bj is denoted
by qji :
qji = Qfij(p
j), 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤M. (3.2)
The fingerprint bit fij is embedded in the block b
j by replacing the pro-
jection pj by its quantized value qji . The jth block of the ith fingerprinted
copy is denoted by bji :
bji = b
j + vj(qji − pj), 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤M. (3.3)
We then convert the column vectors {bji}1≤j≤N into square blocks and
concatenate them to form the new second detail description LP2(Xi). We
finally form the fingerprinted image Xi for user i from the Laplacian pyramid
composed of the original fine and coarse descriptions LP3(I) and LP1(I) and
the fingerprinted intermediate description LP2(Xi).
This spreading technique, unlike a simple embedding of each bit in one
pixel of LP2(I), is more secure because the colluders cannot determine easily
9
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Figure 3.2: The two different quantizers: (a) Q−1(·), and (b) Q1(·).
the location of the fingerprint. Moreover, the visual distortion due to the
embedding can be directly controlled via the quantization step δ.
3.2 Fingerprint extraction
The fingerprint extraction is straightforward. Given the received image Is,
we compute its 3-level Laplacian pyramid {LP1(Is), LP2(Is), LP3(Is)} and
consider the N blocks {b′j}1≤j≤N of the intermediate description LP2(Is).
Each block b′j is projected onto the random direction v
j, similarly to (3.1):
p′j = (v
j)Tb′j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N. (3.4)
The noisy fingerprint f ′ = {f ′j}1≤j≤N is extracted in two different ways
depending on the kind of decoding performed afterwards: hard-bit (f ′ ∈
{−1, 1}N) or soft-bit (f ′ ∈ [−1, 1]N), as shown in Fig. 3.3.
In the hard-bit case, we look for the minimum distance between the pro-
jected value p′j and the points of the two quantizer lattices L−1 and L1. The
extracted bit f ′j is the state of the quantizer for which the minimum distance
was found:
f ′j = argmin
m∈{−1,1}
min
k
∣∣∣(k − m
4
)
δ − p′j
∣∣∣ , 1 ≤ j ≤ N. (3.5)
In order to handle image cropping, we set the components of f ′ to 0
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Figure 3.3: An example of extraction: (a) in the hard-bit case, and (b) in
the soft-bit case. Crosses and circles represent respectively the elements of
the lattices L−1 and L1.
whenever more than half of the corresponding block of the image is erased.
In the soft-bit case, the value of −1 ≤ f ′j ≤ 1 is given by the following
formula:
f ′j = 1−
∣∣∣∣4δ
(
(p′j +
δ
4
) mod δ
)
− 2
∣∣∣∣ , 1 ≤ j ≤ N, (3.6)
where
∣∣f ′j∣∣ = 1 indicates a reliable bit: p′j is equal to an element of L−1 or
L1.
Cropping is handled automatically in the soft-bit case: an extracted value
f ′j close to 0 indicates that the corresponding block of pixels in the image
Is is not reliable, and thus the extracted bit is treated as an erasure by
the decoder. If a region of In is erased (and thus set to a constant value),
the extracted fingerprint components corresponding to this region will be
zero (or close to zero if noise was added) and this region will not bring any
information to the decoder. More generally, soft-decoding performs better
because more information is conveyed by the extracted fingerprint, and the
decoding algorithm is well adapted to soft values. The extraction is always
performed in a soft way in our simulations, except as otherwise specified.
In order to quantify the distortion due to the embedding, we define the
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average embedding power d:
d =
1
K
K∑
k=1
||LP2(Xk)− LP2(I)||22 . (3.7)
3.3 Large quantization step
The value of the quantization step δ is set to the “just-noticeable power.”
It means that we choose the maximum value with the constraint that the
fingerprint remains invisible in the embedded images {Xi}i. We chose the
value δ = 60 in our experiments.
We noticed during the implementation of STDM-Laplace that the embed-
ding/extraction scheme we described can be simplified practically, for such
value of the quantization step. Indeed, for all the images we tested, the em-
pirical standard deviation of the projected blocks components {pj}j is around
10, which is inferior to δ/4 = 15, and thus the projection values {pj}j are
most of the time located in the first quantization bin of either Q−1(·) or Q1(·).
Considering this observation, the quantization which takes place while em-
bedding can be approximated to a simple replacement of the projected value
by δ/4 or −δ/4, respectively, when the fingerprint bit considered is 1 or -1.
Equation (3.3) becomes:
bji = b
j + vj(
δ
4
· f ji − pj), 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤M. (3.8)
The extraction is then also simplified for both the hard-bit and soft-bit
case. In the first case, the extracted bit f ′j is determined by the sign of the
projected value p′j:
f ′j = sgn(p
′
j), 1 ≤ j ≤ N. (3.9)
For the soft-bit case, Equation (3.6) is approximated by the following
formula to determine the extracted fingerprint bits:
f ′j = p
′
j ·
4
δ
, 1 ≤ j ≤ N. (3.10)
This approximation is exact – and thus
∣∣f ′j∣∣ < 1 – most of the time because
p′j is in the first quantization bin most of the time. Even if the components of
the extracted fingerprint f ′ are no longer always in [−1, 1] – because the noise
12
can statistically take any real value – we avoid with this simplified extraction
method some quantization errors. Moreover, since the extracted fingerprint
bits are now proportional to the projection values, the fingerprinting scheme
is more robust against amplitude scaling and histogram equalization.
We used this approximation of STDM for all our simulations.
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Chapter 4
Channel Model
The channel can be modeled in general as a combination of collusion at-
tacks involving several copies, also called copy-merging attacks (averaging,
interleaving, median attacks), non-desynchronizing attacks (addition of white
noise, compression, histogram modification, cropping) and geometric attacks
(rotation, geometric scaling, translation, image warping).
As diagrammed in Fig. 4.1, we decided for our experiments to use the
following cascade of attacks: a copy-merging attack, addition of Gaussian
noise, and another attack (cropping, JPEG compression, histogram equal-
ization, affine transform, homography or image warping).
Multiple-
copies 
attack
X1
XK
Fingerprinted 
images
w
Other 
attack
pGaussian 
noise
Parameter 
vector
Ir
Interleaved 
forgery
Ic In
Figure 4.1: Channel model.
4.1 Non-desynchronizing attacks
4.1.1 Copy-merging attacks
Such attacks are performed by merging several fingerprinted copies in order
to create a forgery where all the fingerprints are also mixed. We considered
three different startegies: averaging, median and interleaving attack. For the
averaging attack, each pixel value of the forgery Ic is the average of the pixel
values of the fingerprinted copies {X1, · · · , XK} at the same location (l,m):
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Ic(l,m) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Xk(l,m). (4.1)
Similarly, the median attack assigns to each pixel value Ic(l,m) the me-
dian of the pixel values {X1(l,m), · · · , XK(l,m)} of the fingerprinted copies.
In the case of interleaving, each colluder contributes a fraction of its pixels
to the “interleaved forgery” Ic. Specifically, each pixel of Ic is given by:
Ic(l,m) = Xk(l,m)(l,m), (4.2)
where k(l,m) is chosen randomly and uniformly from {1, 2, · · · , K}, inde-
pendently for all pixel locations (l,m).
4.1.2 Additive Gaussian noise
The colluders add the white noise directly to the intermediate description of
the Laplacian pyramid LP2(Ic). Each coefficient of the intermediate descrip-
tion LP2(In) is given by:
LP2(In)(l,m) = LP2(Ic)(l,m) + λ · w(l,m), (4.3)
where w(l,m) is drawn from the standard normal distribution N (0, 1), in-
dependently for all pixel locations (l,m), and λ is the standard deviation of
the Gaussian noise.
Instead of choosing a value for λ in our experiments, we rather set the
value of the fingerprint-to-noise ratio FNR = d/λ2, where d is the previously
defined average fingerprint power.
An example of image corrupted with additive Gaussian noise is shown in
Fig. 4.2(b).
4.1.3 Other attacks
We have studied additional attacks: JPEG compression, histogram equaliza-
tion, and cropping. With JPEG compression, the image is first divided in
blocks and the DCT coefficients of those blocks are quantized with respect
to a quality factor. The smaller the quality factor, the more coarsely the co-
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4.2: Examples of attacks on part of Lena image: (a) original image;
(b) additive Gaussian noise with FNR = 1/20; (c) JPEG compression with
quality factor 20; (d) histogram equalization.
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efficients are quantized. Some preprocessing (subsampling of color channels)
and postprocessing (entropy coding) operations are also performed. Fig.
4.2(c) shows an example of JPEG compression with quality factor 20. His-
togram equalization modifies the intensity of the image in a nonlinear way.
An example of histogram equalization is shown in Fig. 4.2(d). Cropping is
performed by deleting entire regions of the image In and replacing them by
black borders (see Fig. 4.3(a)).
4.2 Geometric attacks
4.2.1 Affine transform
Orthographic projection is a way of representing 3D objects in 2D, where
each point is projected orthogonally to the projection plane. This model is
an approximation of the process of taking a picture of an object, when the
object depth is small compared to the distance of the object to the objective
of the camera. The consequence of this model is that every plane in 3D is
projected in 2D through an affine transform.
An affine transform is the composition of a rotation of angle θ, a transla-
tion by (∆x,∆y) pixels, a scaling of factor c, a shearing of angle α, and an
aspect ratio change where r is the new ratio of the height of the image to
its width. The affine transform is then described by a set of six parameters
p = (θ,∆x,∆y, c, α, r). Examples of affine transforms are shown in Fig. 4.3.
To perform the affine transform, the colluders create an image Ir where
the value Ir(x
′, y′) of the pixel at every integer location (x′, y′) is related to
the image In by the following formulas:
Ir(x
′, y′) = In(x, y) (4.4)
(
x
y
)
= A−1
(
x′
y′
)
+
(
∆x
∆y
)
(4.5)
A =
(
c · cos(θ + α) −c · sin(θ + α)
r · c · sin(θ) r · c · cos(θ)
)
(4.6)
where the image indices are defined with respect to Cartesian coordinates
17
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 4.3: Examples of attacks on Lena image: (a) cropping of 50% of image
area; (b) scaling of factor 0.7 and rotation by 35◦; (c) scaling of factor 0.74
and shearing by 25◦; (d) aspect ratio of 1:0.6; (e) image warping with a grid
of size 5 × 5 and maximum shift of 30 pixels; (f) scaling of factor 0.6 and
rolling by 30◦.
where the origin is the center of the image. When x or y are not integers,
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In(x, y) is obtained with bilinear interpolation with the nearest neighbors of
(x, y).
4.2.2 Homography
Perspective projection is a more sophisticated model than orthographic pro-
jection. Based on the pinhole camera model [27], perspective projection takes
into account the focal length and geometry of the optical captors. The whole
model contains eleven parameters but can be simplified to eight parameters
when the object projected is a 2D plane (when a movie is camcorded for
instance). The relation between the 3D plane and its projection is referred
to as a homography.
The eight parameters of a homography are the six parameters of an
affine transform, the angle of camera tilt φ, and the angle of camera roll
ψ. A homography is thus described by a set of eight parameters p =
(θ,∆x,∆y, c, α, r, φ, ψ) (see Fig. 4.3(f)).
A homography is not an affine operation in Cartesian coordinates, but
it becomes linear if we consider the transform in homogeneous coordinates.
We denote by H the 3×3 homography matrix, which is defined up to a scale
factor. The eight freedom degrees of H can be linked to the set of parameters
p [27].
Similarly to affine transforms, homography is performed by creating an
image Ir where the value Ir(x
′, y′) of the pixel at every integer location (x′, y′)
is related to the image In by the following formulas:
Ir(x
′, y′) = In
(x
z
,
y
z
)
(4.7)
 xy
z
 = H−1
 x
′
y′
1
 (4.8)
where the image indices are defined with respect to Cartesian coordinates
and the origin is the center of the image. When x/z or y/z are not integers,
In(x/z, y/z) is obtained with bilinear interpolation with the nearest neighbors
of (x/z, y/z).
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4.2.3 Image warping
Unlike affine transforms and homography which are global operations, image
warping is a local geometric attack parametrized by a large number of attack
parameters.
The image is divided into a mesh, each vertex of which is randomly
shifted. The regions of the mesh are then stretched according to the sur-
rounding vertices. More specifically, the image In is triangulated using a
regular grid of size l× l. To avoid cropping, the borders are left intact. Each
interior node of the mesh is shifted randomly and uniformly within the range
[−sm, sm]. The set p of parameters is then characterized by the horizontal
and vertical shifts of the interior nodes: p = (sh1 , s
v
1, · · · , sh(l−1)2 , sv(l−1)2). The
total number of parameters is 2(l − 1)2.
Given a triangle T in this mesh, with vertices coordinates (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2)
and (X3, Y3), we denote by T
′ the resulting triangle after shifting the ver-
tices, with vertices coordinates (X ′1, Y
′
1), (X
′
2, Y
′
2) and (X
′
3, Y
′
3). The colluders
iterate over all pixels locations {(x′i, y′i)}i which lie in T ′ and compute their
barycentric coordinates (λ1,i, λ2,i, λ3,i) : λ1,iλ2,i
λ3,i
 =
 X
′
1 X
′
2 X
′
3
Y ′1 Y
′
2 Y
′
3
1 1 1

−1 x
′
i
y′i
1
 . (4.9)
Since the barycentric coordinates are invariant to linear shifts of the ver-
tices, the colluders find the equivalent location (xi, yi) of (x
′
i, y
′
i) in the triangle
T :
(
xi
yi
)
=
(
X1 X2 X3
Y1 Y2 Y3
) λ1,iλ2,i
λ3,i
 . (4.10)
The value of Ir(x
′
i, y
′
i) is then equal to In(xi, yi). Similarly to an affine
transform, if (xi, yi) are not integers, the colluders perform a bilinear interpo-
lation with the nearest neighbors. Figure 4.3(e) shows an example of strong
image warping.
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Chapter 5
Features Computation and
Compression
In order to resynchronize the received image, we compare its SURF features
to those of the original image.
5.1 Image features
Image features are used in a wide variety of applications: to recognize specific
instances of an object or a class of objects, to clusterize and segment an
image and to register images. More specifically, image features are interest
points (aka keypoints) in an image. They should be visually significant and
robust to usual image transformations. For example, edges, corners and blob
structures are often considered as interest points in an image.
Features are defined in two stages: first, a feature detector extracts in-
terest points from the input image and stores their location, orientation and
scale; second, a feature descriptor is associated with a neighborhood of each
interest point. The descriptors are designed to be robust against basic affine
transforms, and can then be used to match features, recognize objects and
register images.
Detected feature points need to be repeatable — the same points are
detected when the image is modified up to a certain limit — and distinctive
— we need to be able to distinguish them from each other in order to avoid
matching errors. There are trade-offs associated with both the localization
and description of those keypoints.
A variety of feature detectors and descriptors exists, each of them with dif-
ferent properties. The most common and used ones are SIFT (Scale-Invariant
Feature Transform) [26], and SURF (Speeded-Up Robust Features) [25], an
enhanced version of SIFT. Both are robust and perform very well in image
registration applications [28], but we selected SURF which is computationally
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Figure 5.1: From left to right: the second-order derivatives of a Gaussian
filter (cropped and discretized) in the vertical and diagonal directions re-
spectively, and their respective approximations using box filters [25].
Figure 5.2: Computation of the weighted gradient orientation histogram in
each feature neighborhood.
more efficient [29].
5.2 Feature computation
The SURF algorithm first detects scale-space extrema. This is done by ap-
proximating Laplacian-of-Gaussian using box filters and integral images (an
exact implementation would be too computationally expensive). Examples
of those approximations are shown in Fig. 5.1.
The algorithm then tries to enhance the precision of each extremum lo-
cation by performing bilinear interpolation within the scale-space images.
Moreover, extrema with low contrast or a strong edge response in one direc-
tion only are rejected.
The next step is called orientation assignment: a main orientation is
computed in the neighborhood of each interest point in order to make the
future descriptors robust to rotation. For each interest point, at the correct
scale, the gradient magnitude and orientation are computed in an 8 × 8
neighborhood and a magnitude-weighted gradient orientation histogram is
constructed (see Fig. 5.2). The orientation assigned to the interest point is
the interpolated maximum of this histogram.
The result of those operations is a set of features (or interest points)
described by four parameters: the coordinates (x, y) of the feature, the scale
σ at which the extremum has been found, and the main orientation θ of the
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feature.
The descriptor for each feature is computed in the following way: the
neighborhood of each feature is rotated and rescaled (according to the as-
signed orientation and scale) to form a 20 × 20 pixels region. This region
is partitioned into sixteen 5 × 5 cells. In each cell, the Haar wavelet gradi-
ents are computed in both directions (we denote by dx and dy respectively
the horizontal and vertical gradients). For each 5 × 5 cell, the SURF de-
scriptor consists of the sums of gradients and sums of absolute gradients:∑
dx,
∑
dy,
∑ |dx|,∑ |dy|. The descriptor for each feature is then a real-
valued vector of size 16× 4 = 64.
The number of extracted features Nf depends on the size and the con-
tent of the image but generally ranges from 500 to 2000. The ouput of the
algorithm is a list of the feature locations and a list of 64-dimensional feature
descriptors.
5.3 Feature compression
As an example, the SURF algorithm extracts 1493 features for the 512×512
grey-level Lena image, and thus the size of the feature descriptors (382 kB
when each descriptor component is stored on 32 bits) is larger than the size
of the image (40 kB in JPEG format, with quality factor 75). Therefore,
having SURF features as side information is only an advantage if we can
heavily compress them.
In order to compress efficiently the feature descriptors, we first study their
correlation. Figure 5.3 shows the covariance matrix of the feature descriptors
of a set of 44 images (from the “Miscellaneous” category of USC-SIPI im-
age database). To remove the correlation between the descriptors, we com-
pute the eigenvalues (σ21 > · · · > σ264) and the corresponding eigenvectors
(e1, · · · , e64) of the covariance matrix and multiply the matrix of descriptors
D by the matrix of eigenvectors E:
D′ = ETD, (5.1)
where D′ is the matrix of transformed descriptors.
Following this operation, the transformed descriptors {(d′i,1, · · · d′i,64), 1 ≤
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Figure 5.3: Covariance matrix of the SURF features of a set of 44 images
(the white color represents highest values).
i ≤ Nf} are statistically orthogonal and the first components of the descrip-
tors are the ones with highest variance. We then assign to each dimension
i ∈ {1, · · · 64} of the new descriptor a number of quantization bits Bi such
that the number of quantization bins 2Bi for the dimension i is almost pro-
portional to the square root of the corresponding eigenvalue σ2i , with the
constraint that the total number of bits for a descriptor is Nbits:
Bi =
⌊
log2(σi) +
Nbits −
∑64
i=1 log2(σi)
64
⌋
, 1 ≤ i ≤ 64. (5.2)
Due to the floor operation, the total number of bits after this assignement
is generally not Nbits. Hence, we add one bit to the first ∆bits dimensions,
where ∆bits is defined as follows:
∆bits = Nbits −
64∑
i=1
Bi. (5.3)
We then quantize the transformed descriptors using a Max-Loyd quantizer
with the given number of bits. The parameter Nbits is chosen by simulation
to be as small as possible while resulting in a probability of error that is
approximately the same as in the absence of quantization. We obtained
Nbits = 64 bits, and the compression rate of the descriptors is thus
64
64∗32 =
1
32
.
The compressed SURF file size is only 12 kB. Table 5.1 shows the values of
{Bi}1≤j≤64 for Nbits = 64 bits.
One may object that the side information should also include the eigen-
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Table 5.1: From top to bottom, and from left to right: number of bits
{Bi}1≤j≤64 assigned to each dimension, from the highest eigenvalue to the
lowest.
4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
3 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
3 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0
3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
vectors of the covariance matrix and the quantization codebook and partition
(in order to compress the SURF features of the original image I and the re-
ceived image Ir in the same way). However, we noticed that these quantities
are almost independent of the image used. We computed those three matri-
ces over the same set of 44 images and used them to compress the descriptors
of any image. The effect of using fixed transform and quantization on the
resulting error probability is negligible.
A similar compression method for SURF descriptors was proposed by
Chandrasekhar et al. [30], but the application of the features was more
general, and they limited the compression rate to 1/16.
5.4 Features matching
Given the compressed SURF features from both the original image I and the
received image Ir, we need to match them, prior to resynchronization. This
is done identically to [25]. Specifically, for each feature of the original image
I, the algorithm looks for the closest and second-closest features from the
received image Ir, based on the L1 distance of their descriptors. If the ratio
of those distances is smaller than a given threshold tmatch, then the feature
from image I is matched to its closest neighbor in image Ir.
The resulting match set is a list of pairs of points {(Γi(I),Γi(Ir))}1≤i≤Nm
where Γi(I) and Γi(Ir) denote pixel location, respectively, in the images I
and Ir. The size of the match set Nm depends on the parameters of the
attack and on the image.
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We set the threshold to tmatch = 0.7, as advised in the original implemen-
tation of SURF. For smaller values of the threshold, the matching algorithm
does not provide enough points to be able to resynchronize in some cases,
especially when the feature descriptors are noisy. For larger values of the
threshold, too many outliers are present in the matches, and the resynchro-
nization is not reliable.
26
Chapter 6
Resynchronization
We assume that the received image has been desynchronized through one
of the following attacks: affine transform, homography or image warping.
In an ideal case (i.e. without any other attack), the parameters of the ge-
ometric attacks can be retrieved by solving an overcomplete linear system
using the feature matches. This linear system either uses Cartesian coordi-
nates for affine transform and image warping, or homogeneous coordinates
for homography.
The presence of other attacks (copy-merge attacks, additive noise, etc.)
creates two types or errors in the process of feature detection, description
and matching. The first error is related to localization: two features can
be matched correctly but, since the feature detector is not perfectly robust
to noise and other transforms, those features are not localized identically,
relative to the image. We model the matching process in this case as follows:
Γi(Ir) = f (Γi(I)) +Wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nm, (6.1)
where f denotes the geometric attack, and Wi is the localization error, a 2-D
vector drawn from an uncorrelated normal distribution with zero mean and
variance σ2n.
The other kind of error is related to the feature descriptor: two features
that should have been matched to each other have different descriptors in the
two images and are matched incorrectly. In this case, we model the matching
process as follows:
Γi(Ir) = Oi, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nm, (6.2)
where Oi is a location drawn uniformly over the image Ir. We denote by pi
the probability that Γi(Ir) has an incorrect match (i.e. is an outlier).
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6.1 Estimation-elimination algorithm
Our first algorithm estimates the attack parameters globally (i.e. by consid-
ering all the matches at once). It iterates between two steps: (i) estimation
of the parameters of the attack based on the current matches, and (ii) elimi-
nation of inaccurate matches, given the current estimates of the parameters.
All the geometric transforms we consider can be expressed in homoge-
neous coordinates. Since we need to solve linear systems in our algorithm,
we first normalize the Cartesian coordinates of the feature points before esti-
mating the parameters [31] in order to have well-conditioned problems. This
is done by shifting and scaling the coordinates of the feature points such
that:
1. The centroid of the feature points in each image corresponds to the
origin.
2. The average distance of a feature point to the origin is
√
2.
This normalization is applied in the two images I and Ir independently.
Since the last coordinate in a homogeneous system is 1, this normalization
enhances the stability of the linear system solution used in the algorithm.
When the geometric attack is an affine transform or a homography, the
two steps take the following form:
1. Solve the following overcomplete linear system to get an estimate p(j)
of p:
Γi(Ir) = fa(Γi(I),p
(j)), 1 ≤ i ≤ Nm, (6.3)
where fa(·,p(j)) denotes the affine transform or the homography with
parameter p(j) and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Niter} is the current iteration index.
2. Eliminate the matches (Γ1,i,Γ2,i) that are too distant from p
(j), in the
L1 sense: ∣∣∣∣Γi(Ir)− fa(Γi(I),p(j))∣∣∣∣1 > 100j . (6.4)
When the geometric attack is image warping, the algorithm is very simi-
lar. However, we add a preprocessing step: we delete the matches (Γi(I),Γ2,i)
for which the two matched points Γi(I) and Γi(Ir) are distant by more than
twice the maximum allowed shift sm, in the L
1 sense. Our experiments
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showed that we need at least 5 matches in each triangle to estimate correctly
the parameters. Then, for each triangle of the mesh, we repeat the following
two steps:
1. Estimate the shift of the three vertices of the triangle by solving an
overcomplete linear system, constrained by the assumption that the
vertices on the borders of the image are not shifted.
2. Eliminate the matches (Γi(I),Γi(Ir)) that are not consistent with the
estimated shifts, according to (6.4).
After each triangle has been processed, each node receives six estimates
of its shift, from the six surrounding triangles. We average those values by
weighting them with the number of matches in each surrounding triangle.
After estimating the unknown parameters, we invert the geometric trans-
form using these estimates. This image is close to the original image but not
perfectly synchronized.
We then apply a second time the same algorithm (feature computation,
matching, parameter estimation and attack inversion) to this image. This
second step improves the accuracy of the estimated attack parameters. The
resulting image Is is almost perfectly synchronized due to the fact that the
SURF features are computed with an image that is fairly close to the original
image (the SURF features are not perfectly robust to all affine transforms).
We noticed that the resulting image Is is not systematically closer to the
original image when we apply more than two times the resynchronization
algorithm.
The main advantage of Estimation-Elimination is that the algorithm is
fast. Indeed, we generally need fewer than 15 iterations to obtain accurate
estimates.
6.2 Adapted RANSAC
The RANSAC algorithm — abbreviation of Random Sample Consensus —
was first published by Fischler and Bolles in 1981 [32] and can be a good
alternative to Estimation-Elimination. It estimates the attack parameters
from a small number of matches instead of trying to fit a model to all the
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matches at once. Therefore, outliers have no negative effect on the estimation
when they are not part of the set of matches considered.
However, since the matches include outliers and some localization errors,
the algorithm must try many small sets of matches before finally finding
a model that fits most of the matches. Hence it is computationally more
intense than Estimation-Elimination.
The same data normalization as for Estimation-Elimination is first ap-
plied to the feature points coordinates.
Our adaptation of RANSAC algorithm can be described as follows:
1. Choose a random set of Nran matches.
2. Compute an estimate p(j) of the geometric attack parameters using this
set of matches by solving a linear system.
3. Count the number of matches Sj which agree with this set of parame-
ters, within a given distance dran, i.e. which satisfy:
Sj = |Ej| (6.5)
and
Ej =
{
i,
∣∣∣∣Γi(Ir)− f (Γi(I),p(j))∣∣∣∣1 < dran} . (6.6)
4. Repeat steps 1-3 nran times. Keep the set Ek that corresponds to the
largest number of matches:
k = argmax
1≤j≤Nm
(Sj). (6.7)
5. Compute an estimate pˆ of the geometric attack parameters using this
set of matches Ek.
In the original algorithm, the size Nran of the random set is the minimum
size to be able to fit a model. In the case of homography, eight parameters
have to be estimated so four matches should be enough to get an estimate.
However, we noticed that by setting Nran = 10, we generally had better
estimates and needed fewer iterations. Experimentally, we set dran = 3 and
nran = 1, 000.
30
The complexity of this algorithm is higher than Estimation/Elimination
because we need to estimate the attack parameters twice per iteration, which
is 2,000 times in total, compared to 15 times for Estimation/Elimination.
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Chapter 7
Experimental Results
For our experiments, we used grey-level images of size 512 × 512. The pa-
rameters of our code are: n = 25, Ni = 4, S = 7, p = 0.7, Me = 3,
M = 33, 554, 432, and N = 784 (see Section 2.1 for a definition of these sym-
bols). We tested the performance of our traitor-tracing scheme by running
Monte Carlo simulations. Each simulation was repeated 1000 times for each
considered attack.
The fingerprinting scheme is deemed “robust” if it can retrieve one of
the colluders with probability of error lower than 5%. The extraction of the
fingerprint is always performed in a soft way, except for Sections 7.1 and 7.2.
7.1 Copy-merging attacks
We first compare the robustness of our scheme against different copy-merging
attacks and different numbers of colluders K. Table 7.1 shows the error prob-
ability for different copy-merging attacks, and Table 7.2 shows the effect of
the number of colluders on the error probability. For both simulations, Gaus-
sian noise is added after the copy-merging attack with FNR = 1. Our scheme
is robust to 6 colluders for any copy-merging attack, when soft decoding is
used. In order to design a code resistant to more colluders, one would need
to change the parameters of the code to obtain a longer fingerprint.
7.2 AWGN
We then studied the impact of Gaussian noise on our scheme. The attacks
considered consist of interleaving between 3 copies followed by addition of
Gaussian noise with variable FNR. The different values of FNR and the
corresponding probabilities of errors are given in Table 7.3. Our scheme
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Table 7.1: Copy-merging attacks against which our scheme is robust, with
the corresponding empirical probability of error. Gaussian noise is added
with FNR = 1.
Attack Pe
Interleaving K = 6 2.8%
Averaging K = 6 1.9%
Median attack K = 6 3%
Table 7.2: Effect of the number of colluders on the error probability. Gaussian
noise is added with FNR = 1.
Attack Pe (soft decoding) Pe (hard decoding)
Interleaving K = 3 0.0 0.1%
Interleaving K = 4 0.1 0.2%
Interleaving K = 5 0.2 3.9%
Interleaving K = 6 2.8 17.7%
Interleaving K = 7 9.2 35.5%
Table 7.3: Comparison of the hard and soft extraction, for 3 colluders and
different values of the FNR.
FNR Pe (soft decoding) Pe (hard decoding)
1 0.0% 0.0%
1/10 0.0% 0.1%
1/20 0.3% 3.7%
1/30 1.9% 24.5%
is highly robust to AWGN when soft decoding is perfomed, and is able to
retrieve the fingerprint correctly even when the power of the noise is 30 times
the embedding power. This simulation was done to see what is the “break
point” of the algorithm as a function of FNR. An FNR larger than 1/10 is
not very realistic: the quality of the noisy image Ir is very poor.
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 also clearly show the substantial performance improve-
ments obtained by using soft decoding instead of hard decoding.
7.3 Other non-desynchronizing attacks
Table 7.4 presents the probability of error for JPEG compression, cropping,
and histogram equalization, used in conjunction with the interleaving attack
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Table 7.4: Some non-desynchronizing attacks used in conjunction with inter-
leaving (with K = 3) and addition of Gaussian noise (with FNR = 1).
Attack Pe
JPEG Compression (Q = 45) 2.0%
Cropping (50% of image area) 2.1%
Histogram equalization 3%
Table 7.5: Affine transforms against which our scheme is robust, using Esti-
mation/Elimination algorithm.
Attack and parameters Pe
Scaling ×0.6 4.0%
Scaling ×0.7 and rotation of 35◦ 3.0%
Scaling ×0.74 and shearing of 25◦ 3.9%
Aspect ratio of 1:0.6 3.1%
Table 7.6: Image warping against which our scheme is robust, using Estima-
tion/Elimination algorithm.
Attack and parameters Pe
Warping: 4× 4 grid, 50 pixels max. shift 2.5%
Warping: 5× 5 grid, 30 pixels max. shift 0.8%
Warping: 6× 6 grid, 20 pixels max. shift 1.9%
Warping: 7× 7 grid, 10 pixels max. shift 1.0%
and addition of Gaussian noise with FNR = 1.
7.4 Desynchronizing attacks
This section quantifies the performance of our resynchronization algorithms.
For all those results, the cascade of attacks is the following: interleaving
with 3 colluders, addition of Gaussian noise with FNR = 1, and a geometric
attack.
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show the probability of error when an affine transform
or an image warping is used. We notice our scheme can resist those strong
attacks very well. In those two cases, Estimation/Elimination is used for
resynchronization.
The results presented in Table 7.7 show a comparison between Estima-
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Table 7.7: Comparison of Estimation/Elimination and RANSAC algorithms
for two attack models: affine transform (first 3 lines) and homography (last
three lines).
Attack and parameters Resynchronization # iterations Pe
algorithm (Resync. alg.)
Scaling ×0.6 Est./Elim. 15 4.0%
Scaling ×0.6 RANSAC 1,000 4.3%
Scaling ×0.6 RANSAC 100 11.4%
Scaling ×0.6, Rolling 30◦ Est./Elim. 15 5.0%
Scaling ×0.6, Rolling 30◦ RANSAC 1,000 3.2%
Scaling ×0.6, Rolling 30◦ RANSAC 100 30.2%
tion/Elimination and RANSAC as synchronization algorithms. The three
first lines correspond to the affine transform model, and the last three to
the homography model. Both algorithms result in approximately the same
probability of error in the case of a scaling attack (in the affine transform
model), but RANSAC needs 1,000 iterations when Estimation/Elimination
only needs 15. Thus, there is a trade-off between the complexity of RANSAC
and the resulting error probabilty since the latter increases when the number
of iterations for RANSAC is decreased.
However, in the case of homography, RANSAC performs better than Es-
timation/Elimination when the number of iterations for RANSAC is large
enough.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a complete, practical, robust, and secure im-
age fingerprinting scheme. By using Jourdas’ high-rate code and our Laplace-
STDM embedding scheme, we can accomodate more than 33 million users
and resist coalitions of up to six colluders, while using a short fingerprint. We
showed that our scheme is robust against the most common copy-merging
attacks (averaging, interleaving and median attack), additive Gaussian noise
(with a fingerprint-to-noise ratio of 1/30), JPEG compression, intense crop-
ping, and histogram equalization. Moreover, the embedding scheme ensures
invisibility, security and reliability of the fingerprint.
Our SURF-based resynchronization algorithm is also very efficient: it
can handle geometric attacks that happen in media recording (affine trans-
forms and homography), and other attacks involving more parameters like
image warping. Estimation/Elimination seems more adapted to affine trans-
forms and image warping, and RANSAC is better suited to to homography.
However, RANSAC is globally more complex than Estimation/Elimination
because it needs more iterations. To our knowledge, this is the first fin-
gerprinting scheme that can cope with so many users and severe geometric
attacks.
Future work could include a study of the impact of digital-to-analog and
analog-to-digital transforms on this fingerprinting scheme and solutions to
deal with them.
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